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ESSAYS

NOT TRAINED BY ANGELS
Democratic responsibility begins in elders’ councils, budget
meetings, and volunteer nursery assignments.
By David Henreckson

My four-year-old son once asked me if
our pastor was God. I stifled a laugh,
briefly imagining divinity cloaked in a
Florida Gators football jersey and cargo
shorts, drinking a beer on a Thursday
evening. But my son’s question wasn’t as
ludicrous as it first seemed. To him, our
pastor is the embodiment of absolute
authority; our pastor is the one who stands
removed from the congregation behind a
wooden pulpit, speaking seriously about
Important Things. He wears a dark clerical robe. He presides over the religious
rituals—prayers, baptisms, Communion,
and benedictions—that seem to make the
church, well, church.
Older and perhaps more cynical congregants know that church is more complicated, more mundane, and much messier
than my son’s pre-kindergarten conception of things. Church isn’t all sacred ritual, hocus pocus, smells and bells—or
whatever the Protestant equivalents might
be. Church is nursery assignments, contentious budget meetings, and subpar
potluck dinners. The pastor who thunders
behind the pulpit wears Birkenstocks
under his clerical robe. We, the adults,
know all this.

These two postures toward the church—one
a childlike reverence for authority, the other
a seasoned cynicism about the mundanity
of it all—are clearly at odds. They are at
odds because they both perceive only part
of the truth. What if there were a deeper,
richer conception of ecclesial life and
authority that could help us appreciate not
only the exceptional nature of the church
but also its fundamental ordinariness?
WHAT IN THE WORLD IS THE CHURCH?

Before trying to answer this question, we
need to get a better handle on what we
mean when we refer to “the church” and
how this entity acquires authority to govern its members. Needless to say, both my
four-year-old son and the more mature
cynic have an inadequate view of the
church. Each might get something right
about the church and its authority, but
each is either too immature or too jaundiced to give us a description that truly
captures what we are after.
Nicholas Wolterstorff’s recent book The
Mighty and the Almighty provides an alternative understanding. In Wolterstorff’s
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theology of public life, human institutions
derive authority to exercise control over
their members via delegation from God.
Without that divine authority, those institutions have no binding power. Left in
these general terms, of course, Wolterstorff’s
political theology is almost blandly orthodox: after all, we already have Paul’s maxim
that all authority derives from God. The
real challenge resides in the who, what,
where, when, why, and how lurking behind
Paul’s claim. For instance: What institutions bear God’s authority? How is this
authority transferred from administration
to administration? When does that
power—if improperly exercised—become
illegitimate? To ask these questions is to
begin to immerse yourself in a millenniaspanning conversation across the Jewish,
Christian, and Islamic traditions. When
it comes to Wolterstorff’s view of the
church, one particular feature jumps out.
The church, according to Wolterstorff, is
like no other human community. It doesn’t
“belong to the social identity of any natural people.” Rather, the church is born
from above through the power of the
Spirit. In other words, the church did not
come about because a group of people
“discovered some natural affinity for each
other,” or “learned of some shared occupation, plight, or project.” You do not
become a member of the church because
of your race, gender, or nationality, or even
because you share a set of common interests with your fellow congregants. The
church transcends these natural categories;
it is a “foreign body” in every time and
place: it should not be “the church of any
nation or people.”
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In a political context where religious and
ethno-national interests are often conflated,
this is an appealing vision. It is always helpful to hear a theological reminder that the
church ultimately serves only one sovereign.
Wolterstorff also manages to combine this
emphasis on the independence of the church
with a critical appreciation of liberal democracy. Contrary to some neo-Anabaptists
accounts (think Stanley Hauerwas on one
of his especially cynical days), Wolterstorff
sees modern liberalism as a natural ally of
the church, when properly understood. By
circumscribing the authority of the state
and defining the church as an utterly unique
sort of institution, he carves out space (1)
for the state to recognize its legitimate, Godgiven responsibilities, and (2) for the church
to speak authoritatively to the political community when the state has overstepped its
bounds.
That said, there remains one rather significant problem with this view of the church:
it is very abstract. It seems to ignore how
particular communities—including ecclesial ones—come into existence. If we say
that the church is born of the Spirit, does
this preclude the Spirit from working
through ordinary, mundane, human
means? What does it really mean to describe
the church as “non-natural”? What would
it look like for the church to operate as if
it were not held together by certain “natural affinities,” or common objects of love?
It’s hard to say.
Think about the ways that other human
communities typically form. Your local
CrossFit gym is populated by individuals
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similarly devoted to fitness (or who at least
desire to be devoted). There’s a good chance
the sci-fi book club at your local library is
composed of folks who love Ray Bradbury
and the paradoxes of time travel. Your city
council contains individuals who—whether
from altruistic or selfish motivations—
want to participate in civic life in a more
direct manner. All these communal activities exist because of some joint organizing
purpose. Individuals are willing to give up
time and resources for the sake of the common good achieved by the fellowship. Is
the church really so different?
What if we asked Wolterstorff if his ecclesiology bears the weight of ordinariness?
Can it account for all the mundane activities and interests that constitute the community, not just on Sunday morning, but
also throughout the week? If you asked an
ordinary congregant why they came to
Sunday morning worship, or chaperoned
the youth group’s mission trip, or put up
with another rambling sermon on
Deuteronomy, what would they say in
response? Do congregants submit themselves to these things for the reasons that
Wolterstorff suggests? Or are there more
ordinary, proximate things that draw and
keep them in the ecclesial community?
And if so, what does this say about the
nature of the church and its authority?
This is a rather complicated question, but
it’s important to question whether
Wolterstorff’s account of the church is
sufficiently concrete to explain the social
practices, habits, and sacrifices that make
church the church. It’s well and good to

say the church is born from above, and,
ultimately, that is the correct answer. But
before we get there, there is more to say
about what the church is and how it comes
to exercise authority over its members.

There’s a reason we were not
trained by angels: we have each
other for that purpose.
COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNION

Let’s return to the apostle Paul. If the thirteenth chapter of Romans is the locus classicus of Christian political theology, the
twelfth chapter of 1 Corinthians might
serve a similar role for ecclesiology. Here,
Paul gives us his classic metaphor: the
church is a body constituted by many parts.
Each of these individual parts serves a distinct role, but each does so for the sake of
the body as a whole. There’s a reason why
God gifted some members with specific
talents, and not others: “If the whole body
were an eye, where would the hearing be?
If the whole body were hearing, where
would the sense of smell be?” (NRSV).
And so on. Each member depends on the
rest of the body in order to fulfill its own
function.
Two Reformed thinkers made a great deal
of Paul’s metaphor for the church. In his
Institutes, John Calvin borrowed Paul’s
metaphor to explain why God created the
church in the first place. God could have
spoken to us “without any aid or instrument.” In fact, he could have even spoken
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“by angels.” Instead, God chose fallible
human beings as instruments of his authority. This is why, elsewhere, Paul describes
human beings as temples of God, since
from out of our mouths, he speaks to us
“as from a sanctuary.”
Calvin returns to this metaphor time and
time again: human communication (from
the Latin word communicatio, which is
better translated “fellowship”) is sanctified
by God’s Spirit. God ministers to us
through our sharing with each other. The
mutuality of this arrangement is crucial,
Calvin thinks. If each individual were selfsufficient and had “no need of another’s
aid,” we would all despise each other. God
understood that the best way to counter
human pride was to make us profoundly
dependent on each other. This, in fact, is
what provides for the “strongest bond of
unity” in the church. God establishes the
ecclesial community not through direct
divine intervention or angelic teaching,
but through ordinary human communication. In God’s wisdom, the strongest grace
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is grace mediated through fallible human
instruments.
One of Calvin’s theological heirs, Johannes
Althusius, picked up on this theme and
applied it not just to the church but also to
all of human life. Althusius was trained as a
lawyer and served as a professor for many
years, but later took up a position as a city
leader and church elder in Emden, a coastal
town on the North Sea. In Althusius’s first
career as a legal academic, he made a name
for himself writing about concepts like political sovereignty and absolute power. But after
his move to Emden, interestingly, he revised
his major political treatise to include a much
longer section on the nature of human community. His term of art for community was
something he called the “consociation.”
While the idea was later used in non-theological ways by political theorists, for
Althusius the idea was intensely theological
and very much rooted in his view of the
church. The word “consociation” comes from
the Latin term consociatio. It was a term that
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Althusius’s favourite Roman writer, Cicero,
used to describe the ways that human societies organized themselves through a series of
agreements—or covenants—ordered to some
common good. In Althusius’s own day, the
idea of consociation was often used to
describe the nature of the church—specifically the way that the sacraments and the
Holy Spirit bind the ecclesial community
together in service of God and the world.
Althusius transposes spiritual fellowship into
the political community, noting the harmonies that result when persons with complementary gifts communicate those things
among each other. The gifts of God for the
polis of God.
This background helps to explain Althusius’s
fascinating discussion of the ways human
communities arise, and how they come to
exercise authority over their members. He
explicitly borrows from Calvin’s description
of the church to talk about the basis of all
human sociality. It’s no coincidence, he
argues, that each of us possesses different
skills, personalities, and desires. This all comes
from God, who chose to “distribute his gifts
unevenly” among us so that we would recognize our need for each other. Echoing
Calvin’s description of the church, Althusius
writes that there’s a reason we were not
trained by angels: we have each other for that
purpose.
The crucial point here is that diversity isn’t
a bug—it’s a feature designed to strengthen
the relational bonds that hold us together.
Althusius asks his reader: “If each did not
need the aid of others, what would society
be?” In other words, living well in

community with each other involves a continual process of mutual recognition and
humble exchange. I share my gifts with you
(the ones you lack), and you share yours with
me (the ones I need). Without this mutual
recognition of need, democratic life would
be a shapeless egalitarian void, lacking the
social exchanges and practices that give the
community its very life.
This recognition, and the sharing that follows, allows us to enjoy things we couldn’t
on our own. In society, there can be no autonomous individuals, no blank slates, no noble
savages, no brutish state of nature blood-red
in savage civil war. Instead, the picture that
Althusius paints is that of a body with an
assembly of mutually dependent parts, held
together—and this is quite important—by
something he calls the “spirit” of the community. This spiritual force comes from a
variety of sources: the Decalogue, civil laws,
and (most importantly) the communication
of gifts among individual members. In short,
the spirit draws the citizens of a community
together in a way that is deeper than just the
physical goods they share in common. Just
as Paul and Calvin argue that the Holy Spirit
vivifies the ecclesial body, Althusius argues
that without the spirit of the political community, its body too would wither away and
die.
ROOTING OUT THE DEVIL’S AGENTS

If the community is a body, we might want
to ask, who gets to serve as the head? This
is where things get even more
interesting.
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For someone like Althusius, we first have
to remember, democracy was a four-letter
word. Despite the attempts of later historians to convert Calvin and Althusius into
liberal democrats, these early Protestants
would’ve recoiled at the suggestion that their
writings defended democratic polity. They
had difficulty imagining a democratic society that preserved the hierarchical institutions they believed were the backbone of
civil society. That difficulty is, well, understandable. That said, looking back from the
vantage point of late modernity, we can
identify specific features of Calvin’s ecclesiology and Althusius’s political theology that
are at least friendly to modern democratic
life and norms.
One of these democracy-friendly ideas is
Althusius’s view of authority. If we accept
his idea that human communities come
together when diversely gifted individuals
recognize their need for each other, we
still have to ask who wields authority in
these complex relationships. On this
point, Althusius constantly reminds his
readers that the common goods of the
fellowship—whether ecclesial or political—come first. Any exercise of authority
within the community must be for the
sake of the body as a whole. Private interests should never drive the agenda. The
community can appoint representative
individuals to oversee practical matters,
but these individuals are servants of the
community, not the other way around.
The implication of this view is that if powerful individuals try to game the system
for personal gain, create dissension,
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overstep their responsibilities, or marginalize the powerless, the community must
exercise its God-given authority in
response. Tyrants—even the petty ones—
are a cancer to the community. If human
communities are the basis for human flourishing, if social relationships are themselves
gifts of God’s Spirit, then individuals who
attack them must be rooted out. (Althusius
goes so far as to describe these individuals
as agents of the devil.) And, just as we do
not wait around for angels to instruct us,
neither should we wait for divine intervention to chasten the vicious tyrants in our
midst. That is our responsibility as members of the body.
Let’s make this more concrete: How does
this view of the ecclesial community help
us be better disciples, form better churches,
and act better as corporate or individual
citizens?
I’m confident Althusius would’ve been
quite happy to endorse Wolterstorff’s
description of the church as an institution
born from above by the power of the
Spirit—the community to which God has
specifically gifted his presence, his sacraments, and his Spirit. At the same time,
the church comes together in ways that
are analogous to other human communities. We (in principle, at least) recognize
Christ as Lord, desire to live in accordance
with the norms of Christian discipleship,
and hope to share in the fellowship promised to us through the power of the Spirit.
The content of these common goods may
differ from those in the political community, but they function in a similar way.
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Democratic resistance to unjust power should
have its seedbed in the life of the church.
These two communities are two different
species, we might say, of the same genus.
If all of this is true, it shouldn’t surprise us
that the ways we are formed by the church
affect our other relationships—and also
the ways we are malformed. This is the
flipside: vicious forms of power corrupt all
sorts of communities, not just the church,
and not just the political community. Since
structures of authority do not drop out of
heaven, since we are not in fact trained by
angels, we must be on the lookout for the
ways human communities may have
warped our desires and our very selves.
Since authority emerges from the ground
up, we’ll need to work doubly hard to pursue safeguards and structures that protect
social relationships from the forces that
threaten them.
In a very specific sense, we might describe
this view of the church as democratic,
although not egalitarian. In other words,
structures of authority emerge as we recognize that God has given members of the
community different gifts and callings. The
(rather difficult) work of living well together
entails ensuring that the institutions and
norms that structure society are just and
allow members to participate in the common good in their own unique ways.
This is where the perspectives of my fouryear-old son and the more cynical adult
must converge. Both get something right
and something wrong. The cynic correctly
understands that the church is not perfect,

infallible, or immune to human pettiness
or corruption. Church life requires compromise, sacrifice, and the ability of imperfect, sinful congregants to find ways of
living well together.
A young child is likely too immature to
understand all of this. Yet there is something
that my four-year old son, in his guileless
question to me, did understand. A child can
sense that the ordinariness of the church
masks a deeper reality: the Spirit at work in
the mundane. A child can sense, but perhaps
can’t explain why or how, there’s something
special, sanctified, and meaningful about the
church—and that this is no less true because
of its ordinariness. God’s grace can be communicated through a mediocre sermon,
through Communion wine purchased at
Costco, through the mutual accountability
offered by a trusted friend in a time of testing, or through the regular exhortation to
solidarity with the poor in an age that instinctively reveres the powerful.
These examples reveal a way of life that
forms us—sometimes for good, and sometimes for ill. What they also reveal, perhaps
especially when they fall short, is a set of
communal norms and relations that are
greater than the sum of their parts.
Individual talents and vocations are given
a significance and purpose that they lack
apart from the social relationships that
exist in the ecclesial community.
Perhaps just as importantly, we have to
recognize that the church ought to give us
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a model for communal correction and
mutual accountability. The church, of all
communities, should be intimately aware
of the ways sin and vicious power can corrupt human fellowship. It shouldn’t be a
surprise that a church elder from Emden
was one of the first political thinkers to
argue that communities have a God-given
obligation to defend themselves against
vicious powers. After all, Althusius’s
defence of political resistance to tyranny
derives from his Calvinist conception of
the church.
Here, it’s important to remember that
Calvin’s and Althusius’s claim that we are
not trained by angels has a double meaning: it shows us not only that human beings
may mediate God’s authority to his people
but also that no one can claim unmediated
authority over another. The powerful who
forget this principle should have an entire
flesh-and-blood community to answer to.
Democratic resistance to unjust power
should have its seedbed in the life of the
church. Protestantism catches a lot of flack
for allegedly breaking with traditional conceptions of authority, but this is one social
outcome that heirs of Luther, Calvin, and

Althusius ought to embrace. Here, we
might even take notes from the work of
the Protestant ethicist Luke Bretherton
and the theologically attuned atheist Jeffrey
Stout, who both show how the social practices of Christian churches can form congregants into prudent, courageous democratic citizens. The lesson here is that
democratic life and democratic responsibility ought to begin in elders’ councils,
congregational budget meetings, and volunteer nursery assignments. Calvin and
Althusius may have shrunk back from the
d-word itself, thanks to its historical connotations, but in at least one very real sense,
we have the structures of modern democratic life because these Reformers valued
mutual accountability, popular governance,
and the life-giving work of the spirit within
the communal body.
Even the best of communities can only
give us half-glimpses of the full reality of
these things. Human communities are of
course just that. And yet, it is the humanness of the church that gives us reason to
hope—hope that this ordinary life is shot
through with the in-breaking grace of the
life to come.

DAVID HENRECKSON is a contributing editor of Comment. He is
assistant professor of theology at Dordt College, where he also
directs the Andreas Center for Reformed Scholarship and Service.
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